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Despite not being grounded in the classic nation-building dynamic of citizenship identified by 
T.H.Marshall, EU citizenship offers social rights and welfare protection to non-nationals on a 
principle of non-discrimination. We narrate a creeping process of retrenchment by which 
European member states have used policy strategies to undermine this principle, by 
transforming the unique idea of free movement of persons in the EU to just another form of 
‘immigration’ which can be subject to selectivity and exclusion. As Europe’s multiple recent 
crises have unfolded, political resources were found to effect this transformation tangibly via 
reshaping access to welfare for EU citizens. Focusing on the cases of UK and Germany, we 
discuss how despite their distinctive welfare regimes and labour market systems, these two 
countries have led the way toward a dismantling of non-discrimination for EU citizens and 











European citizenship – specifically the ‘freedom of movement of persons’ for nationals 
within the EU, and the non-discrimination by nationality it entails – was never a fully fledged 
form of citizenship on the national welfarist model (Marshall 1950).
1
 Yet it has long stood as 
the most legally developed form of ‘post-national membership’ (Soysal, 1994) in the world. 
This is the ‘fourth freedom’ – of capital, goods, services and persons – on which the 
cosmopolitan normative claims of the European Union arguably rest (Favell, 2014). Legally, 
the notion of European citizenship has entailed the non-discrimination of EU nationals 
resident in other member states on a wide range of rights and entitlements – including many 
social and welfare benefits usually available only to citizens of the country. As the EU has 
moved through the sequence of crises brought on by the rejection of the Constitution (2005), 
the global economic crash and sovereign debt crisis in Europe (2008-14), the Mediterranean 
refugee crisis (2014-16), and the British referendum on exiting the EU (2016), we argue that 
‘freedom of movement of persons’ has increasingly been seen politically as problematic, and 
most likely unsustainable; it has been reduced to just another form of ‘immigration’ like 
others, that must be subject to the same kinds of sovereign control, restriction and selectivity 
imposed on conventional forms of international migration from outside the EU. 
 
The drivers for this changing access to rights are not difficult to surmise. The new migrations 
and cross-border mobilities associated with freedom of movement have increasingly been 
seen by national electorates as a cause of the growing, hostile ‘populist’ reaction to the EU 
(de Vries, 2018). Not least, this is because this ambiguous migration is seen to fundamentally 
clash with the privileges enshrined in the idea of the European welfare state for national 
citizens as part of the post-war European social compact (Manow et al., 2018). Our aim in 
this paper is not to repeat these general explanations, but rather to fill in the narrative details 
of how this change has occured, while pointing to a surprising convergence in policies among 
leading member states, despite their well known ‘varieties’ of welfare state and labour market 
institutions. We focus on changes that have taken place in the two member states which have 
seen the largest populations of free moving EU nationals, the UK and Germany, but which 
also represent clearly distinct welfare state and labour market contexts. Their leadership in 
these matters is pulling the rest of Europe towards a restriction on free movement rights that 
will largely terminate the cosmopolitan claims of EU freedom of movement rights. A rump 
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form of EU citizenship – for the more privileged – may be saved at the expense of an idea of 
non-discrimination for all Europeans. 
 
For sure, EU citizenship was always an ideal that has failed to fully live up to its normative 
potentiality (Shaw 2015). Its normative claims have rested more on the facilitation of 
everyday and participatory practices beyond legal and technical borders (Wiener 1998; Isin 
and Saward 2013). Focusing on technical analysis of law, policy and implementation, social 
policy scholarship on EU citizenship in recent years, as we document, has largely 
concentrated on critiquing the unjust economic stratification of non-discrimination rights, on 
their increasing conditionality and precarisation, and on legal challenges and roll-back 
(Pennings and Seeleib-Kaiser, 2018; Bruzelius, 2018). At the same time, it has stressed 
divergence in application of welfare rights, generally upholding a view in which coordinated 
welfare state economies have offered better protection (Carmel et al, 2011; Römer 2017). In 
this context, a strongly social democratic voice among some scholars has emerged in political 
economy – notably Wolfgang Streeck – arguing against the “neo-liberal” consequences of 
open borders and for the maintenance of highly regulated national economies (Streeck, 2014). 
We challenge this mainstream, left-leaning literature on two grounds. Firstly, we point to 
ways in which it was the putatively ‘neo-liberal’ British model which in fact best fulfilled the 
normative post-national promise of EU freedom of movement, through the effectiveness of 
non-discrimination as a norm in employment and organisational practices and its positive 
selection dynamics. And secondly, we stress the convergence in restriction across all types of 
welfare state economies in Europe, which question assumptions about the inherent deviance 
of the British ‘Brexit’ from EU laws and ideals still supposedly supported better elsewhere.  
 
After a brief survey of the debate on post-national membership rights and recent analyses of 
EU citizenship by social policy scholars, we lay out the specific legal and policy 
developments that have effected changes to welfare rights for EU citizens in the UK and 
Germany. These developments have made possible a convergence of European practices 
around the kinds of restrictions of rights of EU citizens, ironically, very much in line with 
those negotiated by British Prime Minister David Cameron to salvage British membership of 
the EU. He failed, and Britain has opted out of EU law. Britain Brexiting, however, will not 
be enough to save the ‘fourth freedom’ in Europe.  
 




Critical social policy analysts are of course right that EU ‘citizenship’ is not really citizenship 
– by any normative standard of full national citizenship. In a classic understanding, such as 
T.H.Marshall (1949[1965]), social rights are the last evolutionary development of citizenship 
after civil and political rights. All such dimensions are necessary to ensure equal membership 
for all citizens. This theory of social citizenship referred to national citizens only (Janoski 
1998). How and why such rights might have been extended to immigrants in postwar 
European welfare states thus became a key question. Following in Marshall’s steps, Soysal 
(1994) identified an emergent conception of ‘post-national’ membership, anchored in human 
rights and individualist (global) ‘personhood’. Moreover, the sequencing of rights’ accession 
was different: migrant workers in postwar Europe accrued social rights relatively quickly but 
encountered great difficulties in acquiring political rights. Elaborating on this, Guiraudon 
(1998) showed how these advances typically occured ‘behind gilded doors’: in the offices of 
lawyers and bureaucrats following procedures and norms rather than listening to angry 
electorates.  
 
The unprecedented extension of immigrants’ rights across Europe during the postwar period 
thus received much attention (i.e., Bauböck, 1994; Hansen and Hager, 2010), not least 
because of its suggestiveness in terms of a normative cosmopolitanism. Controversy 
continued over the source of these rights: whether grounded in national political and legal 
dynamics of inclusion (Hammar, 1985; Joppke, 2001), or pulled by ‘post-national’ forces of 
individualisation and international institutional isomorphism, as suggested by the altered 
sequence in the post-war period (Jacobson, 1996; Bosniak, 1998). Rights for immigrants 
however tend to assume the need for naturalisation and full national ‘integration’. EU 
migrants are anomalous in this view: their claim to rights must somehow therefore be ‘post-
national’. In line with this, the parallels with human rights remain an important reference for 
the normative power of EU citizenship rights (Soysal 2012). Yet these clearly derive in 
formal terms more from a market building logic: of building a single economic space for the 
four factors of economic production, that would extraordinarily include the free movement of 
persons alongside the freedom of movement of capital, goods and services (Favell, 2014).. 
 
Because of these complexities, the literature on international migration has generally not 
done a good job in distinguishing such ‘freedom of movement of persons’ from other, more 
conventional types of ‘immigration’, that tend to be at the centre of most discussion. This 
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follows the simple (nationalist) tendency in national political and media debates to see all 
foreigners resident in the territory as ‘immigrants’ subject to national sovereign political 
control. There is a dangerously regressive slippage at work here. Whereas once EU migration 
would have been understood as novel form of spatial mobility unique to the European 
regional project – i.e., a fundamental freedom linked to the expansive building of an 
economic and political community (Recchi, 2015) – it has been increasingly reframed as just 
another form of ‘immigration’ to be absorbed by overloaded nation-states – adding to 
hostility already surrounding asylum seekers, irregular migration and existing ethnic and 
racial minorities. The implication of ‘non-discrimination by nationality’ on migrant rights – 
whether political, social or economy – is however that EU free movers are not legally or 
normatively ‘immigrants’ at all, but rather EU nationals simply living or working in another 
part of Europe – that Europe is their primary ‘homeland’ or (even) ‘society’, as it were. This 
is the particular normative source of the cosmopolitan claim of EU citizenship (Kostakopolou 
2008).   
 
The testing ground of this claim and its de facto limits have been seen in recent debates 
among critical social policy and legal scholars, on the problematic recognition and 
implementation of welfare rights for EU citizens across borders. As freedom of movement 
has expanded quantitatively – with the accession of East and Central European member states 
from 2004 (Favell, 2008a), and then new youth and labour migrations after the economic 
crisis in the South (Barbulescu, 2017; Lafleur and Stanek, 2017) – legal and political 
framings of these migrations have indeed changed. Scholarship is of course adamant that 
there is little evidence to substantiate one of the clear symptoms of this shift: the accusations 
rife in populist media and, increasingly, among mainstream politicians, about abusive 
‘welfare tourism’ and ‘poverty migration’ by mobile EU citizens (Dustman et al., 2010; 
Giuletti et al., 2011; Ehata and Seeleib-Kaiser, 2017; Vargas-Silva, 2017). Yet it has also 
charted a clear trend across Europe towards new modes of restriction, differentiation of 
‘wanted’ and ‘unwanted’ migrants, and sovereign state control over migration selection 
dynamics. The expansive ‘supra-national’ tendencies of an earlier European Court of Justice 
have in recent years reversed and sustained popular suspicion against the legitimacy of non-
national welfare claims (Menendez 2014). The literature has always emphasised areas in 
which EU citizenship rights failed to fulfill participatory norms of citizenship (Meehan, 1993; 
Shaw, 2015), or have been stratified according to socio-economic status (i.e., excluding the 
non-economically active), or unequal due to country of origin and destination differences 
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(Roos, 2016; Bruzelius et al, 2017). Conditionality – for example, rules of residence – have 
been used to impose further restrictions (Bruzelius et al, 2015; Dwyer et al, 2018). Social 
policy analysts have highlighted the creative ways that welfare states or national courts have 
devised new modes of implementing EU directives, quarantining EU citizens away from 
certain benefits (Blauberger and Schmidt 2014; Kramer et al, 2018; Martinsen and Werner, 
2019; Heindlmeier and Blauberger 2017). O’Brien (2015) construes the eviction of EU 
citizens from the welfare state as a means to achieve immigration targets. Geddes and Hadj-
Abdou (2016: 236) note these changes as an effective strategy to limit the power of populist 
parties: to simulanously signal ‘commitment[s] to forms of social protection associated with 
the national welfare state [because they] face certain electoral punishment if they back too 
overtly away from these’. Finally, there has been evidence advanced on how restrictiveness 
and categorisation of non-economically viable EU foreigners can be used to further cement 
welfare retrenchment against similarly unwanted welfare claims of marginal and vulnerable 
national citizens (Anderson, 2013; Shutes, 2016). 
 
At the same time, the social policy literature is still deeply embedded in comparative views of 
welfare states and ‘varieties of capitalism’ that continue to stress likely differences in 
outcomes across different regime types (in the classic line of Esping-Anderson, 1999; Hall 
and Soskice, 2001). The broadest frameworks conjoining immigration, welfare and political 
economy predict different outcomes, while not clearly differentiating theoretically freedom of 
movement (ie. in the EU legal context) from other forms of labour movement (Sainsbury 
2012; Afonso and Devitt, 2016). Applied work thus still finds differences concerning, for 
example, the so-called ‘neo-liberal’ British case, for example, compared to Scandinavian or 
continental models: either in terms of public attitudes towards social citizenship driving 
political outcomes (Bruzelius et al, 2014) or the fact that more coordinated welfare state 
economies will be more generous (Römer, 2017). 
  
Brexit would seem to confirm this hypothesis – at least as regards commitment to normative 
European principles on the continent. Ruhs’ widely read work on the basic negative trade off 
between open immigration and extensive welfare rights (Ruhs 2013), reprising Milton 
Friedman via  Freeman (1986), leads to the conclusion that the British combination of open 
accession for EU migrants and universal basic welfare provision was (politically) 
unsustainable (Ruhs 2015); by implication, it confirms the view that continental welfare 
states, such as Germany – which are also apparently drifting in a neo-liberal direction – will 
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need to shore up the rights of national workers against foreign migrant workers, if they are to 
retain any credible welfare state protection for their ‘own’ citizens. 
 
Yet the virtue of EU freedom of movement of persons – when it worked economically and 
socially to build a more integrated, cross-border Europe – was precisely that it defied these 
conclusions. Effectively, the new migration system created by the ‘fourth freedom’ set up a 
different equation in which all kinds of temporary, pendular, transnational, and non-linear 
forms of mobility short of permanent settlement and re-naturalisation (i.e. classic 
‘immigration’) were made possible as viable economic modes of living within the EU, 
protected by a substantial transnational welfare net underpinning an effectively ‘flexisecure’ 
cross-border labour market across the EU. The point then missing in nearly all conventional 
analyses, is that it was the UK – the most popular destination of internal European free 
movement – which in fact best embodied the EU’s ‘win-win-win’ ideal theory of freedom of 
movement (Borjas 1999). The booming UK economy of the late 1990s and 2000s paired 
positively selected, open bordered migration with a basic (largely unused) welfare net. This 
had positive results for the EU citizens themselves, for the receiving country (where 
economic demand was high), but also sending countries – which received benefits from 
transnational flows and further embedded European economic integration (Favell, 2008b; 
Gordon et al, 2007; Portes, 2016). This story has been lost in the academic panic over 
nationalist democratic ‘revolt’ against the EU. Put another way, the ‘progressive dilemma’ 
highlighted by the roll-back to national social democracy so vehemently proselytised by 
Streeck (Parker, 2017), has meant that left leaning scholarship everywhere has concluded that 
in order to stop populism it is only right that the ‘left behind’ national working classes have 
to be protected from the ‘post-national’ claims of foreign ‘immigrant’ workers pouring into 
the country under EU freedom of movement clauses (Kriesi et al, 2008; Guilley, 2015; de 
Vries, 2018; Manow et al, 2018; Goodhart, 2017;  Eatwell and Goodwin, 2018).   
 
Post-crisis Europe is indeed choosing this path, sacrificing the ‘fourth freedom’ for national 
populist political expediency by brutally dismantling the ‘post-national’ implications of EU 
citizenship rights – as social policy analysts have ably documented. A key moment came 
when the Netherlands, Austria, Germany and the UK jointly sent a letter to the Irish 
Presidency of the EU in 2013, requesting the ample revision and retraction of welfare rights 
for certain categories of EU migrants. Invoking a strain on public services and social security, 
they asked it to introduce provisions to enhance their capacity to restrict access when needed 
8	
	
(Guild, 2017). Yet Europe has moved this way not by converging on a so-called ‘neo-liberal’ 
model (as nearly all the mainstream commentary claims), but rather by converging on a 
frankly nationalist (as well as false) view of the sustainability of workers’ rights and welfare 
protection. For this to happen, ‘free movers’ had to become ‘immigrants’ again, a trend as 
deeply anchored in the (thereby) methodologically nationalist underpinning of much current 
academic scholarship, as it is in overtly nationalist politics and nationalist media. What we 
turn to now, is how the European trends have been led by the UK and Germany, and effected 
along parallel lines – despite their very different welfare states and labour markets – and why 
Brexit only confirms a European trend rather than British exceptionalism. Our data builds on 
primary research of official policy documents, guidelines and reports which were collected 





RETRACTION AND DELAY OF WELFARE RIGHTS FOR EU CITIZENS 
 
In the cold light of the Brexit referendum outcome, much has been made of the momentous 
decision of the then Labour Government in the UK to ‘open the doors’ to what is often 
misleadingly referred to as ‘EU immigration’, by not imposing accession delays on the new 
Central and East European (CEE) member states in 2004 (Ford and Goodwin, 2017; Evans, 
2016). At the same time, there is little doubt that Britain in the 1990s and through the 2000s – 
that is well before the CEE accessions, as well as after the economic crisis of 2008 – was by 
far the most attractive and successful economy in Europe in terms of non-discriminatory 
work opportunities and ‘fairplay’ organisational practices for intra-EU migrants, and the 
subsequent selection effects for the economy (Vargas-Silva, 2017). It consistently attracted 
the brightest and the best, the youngest and most successful, and on into the larger-scale CEE 
migrations, it continued to attract the most entrepreneurial and (financially) least vulnerable 
of intra-EU migrants. For example, in 2015, (male) employment rates for A8 residents stood 
at 91% whereas for A2 residents it was a slightly lower 89% per cent; a solid +17% and 
+15% higher than for British-born males respectively (Rienzo, 2016: 4). Similarly, 
employment rates for women were higher for A8 and EU14 than for those born in UK. As we 
will see, Germany has done less well in bringing EU citizens into the labour market.  
 
The full story of how and why freedom of movement was twisted into ‘EU immigration’ – 
thereby becoming the main driver of the anti-EU vote in Britain – is a political story, not one 
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that has any economic foundation (a story we tell elsewhere: see Favell and Barbulescu, 
2018). What we focus on here, rather, are the precise legal and policy moves Britain and 
Germany have made to untie the knot between freedom of movement and access to welfare 
for EU nationals.  
 
It is a timeline not explained by a simple chronology of European crises, nor easy 
assumptions about left-wing vs right-wing governmental preferences. The retrenchment can 
in fact be traced back to 1994, during the Conservative government of John Major, as well as 
key points during the New Labour boom years (1997-2010). As a result, on the face of it, the 
UK’s ‘neo-liberal’ welfare state and the unrestricted access of EU citizens to benefits could 
not be further apart. Because of its reliance on means-tested benefits and low rates of 
replacement pay unattractive for workers, as well as a preference for private welfare 
solutions, the UK seemed primed as the European country to least fear abuses. A peculiar 
culture of compliance – following EU rules quasi-religiously, while constantly chafing in 
political terms at the regulation – cemented a context in which an ‘ideal’ highly Europeanised 
labour market was possible.  
 
Looking back it is surprising how efficiently the UK developed strategies to further curb 
welfare for EU citizens. In particular, these centre on a series of four interlinked ‘tests’ to 
which all EU migrants are subject (although clearly targeting CEE migrants): the Habitual 
Residence Test (first introduced in 1994); the Right to Reside Test (introduced in May 2004); 
the Genuine Prospect of Work Test; and the Minimum Earnings Threshold Test (both 
introduced in March 2014). Welfare tests are efficient measures of reducing access as they 
depend on claimants meeting additional requirements and, crucially, involve an element of 
discretion, open to hostile interpretation in a given political environment (Guma, 2018). If 
passed, these tests give access to different components of the benefits system. For example, 
the right to reside is associated with most types of welfare provision: income support, 
income-based jobseeker allowance, pension credit, housing benefit, council tax reduction, 
child benefit, child tax credit, universal credit (discontinued), and housing assistance from 
local authorities. In turn, the Habitual Residence Test gives access to means-tested benefits 
such as disability benefits and carer’s benefit (attendance allowance, disability living 
allowance, personal independence payment and carer’s allowance). The Genuine Prospect of 
Work Test gives access to housing benefit tax credits and child benefit while the Minimum 
Earnings Threshold Test opens up to income-based job seeker allowance (JSA IB), income 
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support (IS), income-related employment and support allowance (ESA IR) and state pension 
credit (SPC). 
 
The move towards restricting access to welfare thus started as long ago as 1994 when the 
Conservative government introduced the so called Habitual Residence Test (HRT) which 
required EU citizens (and returning British citizens) to have lived for a period of time before 
qualifying for welfare provisions. While residence requirements are not unusual there was no 
statutory definition of HRT, which introduced uncertainty and arbitrariness. It was the agency 
administrating the test, the JobCentre, and in particular a public servant with decision-making 
powers – known (ominously) as the ‘Decision Maker’ – who was the authority who could 
finally attest whether a person passed the test and qualified for the benefits (formally enjoyed 
by all legal residents regardless of nationality). In a later version of the test, the Decision 
Maker was asked to ‘determine the main centre of interest of a person’s life’.  
 
From 1994, the Habitual Residence Test has become a permanent feature of welfare 
provision for EU citizens. In a sense, it was an early attempt to align their supposedly 
‘privileged’ status with the well-known ‘hostile environment’ that has long existed for non-
European migrants. The HRT was revised and made stricter on several occasions, which 
tended to coincide with any opening of the labour market to EU citizens from CEE countries: 
first in May 2004 under the Labour Government, which had otherwise lifted restrictions on 
work and residence, and again in December 2013, under the Coalition Government. Upon 
introducing the ‘new, more robust’ version of the test, the Department for Work and Pensions 
(DWP) proudly stated that: ‘[F]or the first time, citizens will be quizzed about what efforts 
they have made to find work before coming to the UK and whether their English language 
skills will be a barrier to them finding employment” (Kennedy, 2015). 
 
The new version of the HRT came into force on 1
 
January 2014, the very day that restrictions 
for workers from Romania and Bulgaria were lifted. The role of the Right to Reside Test 
(2004), meanwhile, is to define the EU citizens who can stay in the country after the first 
three months. It was introduced by the Labour Government as a necessary pre-condition to 
pass the Habitual Residence Test in anticipation of the arrival of A8 citizens to Britain in 




The Coalition Government undoubtedly ratcheted up the rhetoric of restrictive ‘immigration’ 
policies symbolically (and misleadingly applied) against EU legislation. The Genuine 
Prospect of Work Test (GPoW) and the Minimum Earnings Threshold Test (METT) 
corresponded thereby to a second generation of welfare tests. Initially, the  GPoW was to be 
applied only to those EU citizens arriving after 1 January 2014. However, the DWP later 
revoked its decision and started applying it retrospectively to all EU citizens who were 
already receiving benefits, but who under the new regulation would now not have qualified 
(DWP 2015). The purpose for revisiting these rules and extending it to other categories of EU 
citizens was for the authorities – in this case the JobCentre – to be able to decide whether 
they still qualified to remain in the UK under EU law. The basic Right to Reside becomes 
supplemented by further tests, ostensibly designed to check for capability to find work, but 
which can be used to undermine the basic test. In order to satisfy the GPoW test, beginning 
May 2015, jobseekers from EU countries who had stayed in the country and received 
income-related JSA had to provide compelling evidence of scheduled interviews or contracts. 
If they passed this test, the JSA could be extended for only an additional two months. 
 
Some of this will seem familiar to anyone who has seen the Ken Loach film (2016) I, Daniel 
Blake, about an English worker serially humiliated in his quest for welfare support by the 
tests and barriers he is forced to pass through to claim his rights. What is distinctive is that 
the familiar British bureaucratic apparatus was being applied to actively remove any 
incentive to stay from anyone who did not have viable access to the labour market. Even this 
battery was not enough. EU citizens also had to prove that their employment was not 




To thus evaluate what might constitute ‘genuine and effective work’, the UK unilaterally 
introduced a fourth test: the “Minimum Earnings Threshold Test” (METT). METT was used 
to restrict the meaning of a being a ‘worker’ or ‘self-employed’ under British and EU law. In 
effect, it introduced a strict financial and temporal definition for what might be considered 
‘genuine and effective work’: an income of minimum £663 gross per month (or £153 per 
week), as well as a period of time (minimum three months) before any benefit might be 
claimed in case of loss of work. The threshold was set at £663/month (the equivalent of 24 
hours per week at the rate of national minimum wage), because this is the level at which 




METT is nonetheless problematic because indirectly it gave British authorities control over 
who could be considered  a genuine ‘worker’. It therefore introduced differentiation in the 
face of EU law according to the type of work one has. This was clearly a move in the 
direction of seizing back state control vis-à-vis the European market over lower-end, possible 
less “wanted” workers; normally the definition of a ‘worker’ would be the competence of EU 
free movement legislation. In addition, equally problematic was the fact that the threshold de 
facto excluded part-time workers – again in conflict with EU law, a clear departure from EU 
principles (O’Brien, 2015).  
 
Squeezed between an intensely rewards-driven open labour market for those who could 
succeed, and a welfare system that had already shut down many of the entitlements to non-
discrimination, well in advance of Brexit and all that, the UK had ironically hit upon the ideal 
highly selective, off-shore model for freedom of movement. What was not under control, 
though, were the political consequences of sustaining a false public image of the ‘EU 
immigration’ this attracted. David Cameron, seeking only to resolve the question of EU 
membership for his wayward party, bought into an ever harder line of rhetoric against the 
‘welfare tourists’ of the EU, who had abused Britain’s open doors. His gambit was that a deal 
with the EU on toughening even more the restrictions to welfare benefits would deliver a 
referendum result to stay with unpopular but economically vital EU membership, while doing 
little to alter selective, labour demand driven flows. His EU partners were not particularly 
reticent in agreeing; as we will see, the rest of the EU has been looking for ways to slide 
away from the principle of non-discrimination on social rights. Echoing the May 2015 
Conservative Manifesto, Cameron’s proposal was to (1) remove child benefits and child tax 
credit for children living outside UK; (2) introduce a four-year waiting period in which EU 
citizens would only contribute to National Insurance, but have no access in-work benefits; 
and (3) cut taxpayer support for job-seekers. The final agreement largely confirmed British 
PM’s demands with the exception of indexing rather than removing benefits for children 
residing abroad. It also limited the exclusion from in-work benefits to newly arriving 
Europeans for a period of seven years, eight less than what Cameron requested.  It was a 
‘deal’, as EU negotiator Donald Tusk famously tweeted. Freedom of movement rights were 
being undone on all sides. But the real damage was done already. Why would a population 
convinced by its leading politicians that the scare stories and lies about welfare abuse and 
hurt to British workers perpetrated by EU nationals in the UK were true, be suddenly 
assuaged and happy to accept their continued residency, with a series of propositions that 
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only debarred social rights abuse to those who were not (significantly) engaged in it? All 
British voters could see were high numbers of so-called ‘EU immigrants’ that were not going 
down. So they accepted what UKIP leading voice Nigel Farage (as well as several influential 
scholars) had been saying all along: that these mobile populations were in fact the type of 
unwanted ‘immigrants’ that Britain could only block from its shores by leaving the EU. 
 
GERMANY:  
WELFARE RETRENCHMENT IN THE ABSENCE OF ECONOMIC CRISIS 
 
Germany was one of the few countries in the world with positive growth during the global 
economic crisis, and its commitment to the principles of EU membership cannot be 
questioned. Yet it has in recent years set off on its own unilaterial retrenchment on welfare 
benefits for EU citizens. Like the UK, Germany has also welcomed a large number EU 
citizens who are a young, skill-endowed population that do well in the German labour 
market. In 2003 it was the destination for 2.7 million EU-born citizens; by 2017 it had 
reached 4.7 million, with large increases among Poles, Italians, Romanians, Greeks and 
Bulgarians (Statistischesamt, 2018). However, other statistical indicators are decidedly less 
rosy than in the UK. In 2016, 4.9% of EU27 citizens were unemployed, compared to 3.4% 
for natives. While reliance on social assistance in households where no-one works is almost 
identical (around 7.5%), 10.6% of EU27 citizens are at risk of poverty, compared to 6.2% of 
Germans. The selection profile of EU migrant workers in Germany is different, tailored to 
more lower-end work under dual labour market conditions, with high skilled professions in 
many sectors much more restrictive to non-nationals than the UK (Statistischesamt, 2017: 62-
69, 81); welfare access, meanwhile, is inherently stratified by its contributory conditionality 
(Römer). 
 
What is striking, is that despite the later start, Germany has rapidly – in just two years from 
2014 to 2016 – designed and implemented its own mechanisms of further selectively 
restricting welfare entitlements for unemployed EU citizens and their families. Much of this 
has been in the form of symbolically visible concessions to some sections of the Conservative 
Party (CSU) particularly in the Southern Länder; and the Eurosceptical populists from the 
Alternative fuer Deutschland (AfD), at a time of huge controversy over other immigration 
issues, notably the Mediterranean migration crisis. As in the UK, assimilating distinct types 




As is often the case in Germany, the conservative current began in the South. In 2014, Horst 
Seehofer, Bavarian Governor and regional leader of the Conservative Party, argued that the 
authorities had to take stricter measures to ensure freedom of movement rights were not used 
to gain rights to German social protection. The German association of cities and towns 
(Städtetag) had already raised the issue in 2013 and early 2014 but did not have the political 
clout to push it further. Seehofer called for an amendment to the EU directive on freedom of 
movement (Directive 38/2004) to tighten conditions for permanent residence for EU citizens 
and to have legal clarification on the limits of the anti-discrimination principle in EU law. 
These statements followed alarming reportage from the German tabloids foreseeing a new 
wave of arrivals in the coming year, as 2014 marked the end of restrictions for workers from 
Romania and Bulgaria.  
 
Only a few years earlier the same tabloids had raised the alarm about the arrival of Southern 
Europeans, young Italians, Greeks, Portuguese and Spaniards escaping the severe economic 
crisis at home. While absolute numbers were not spectacular, the news about the revival of 
the South-North migratory routes once used by guest-workers, had elements of triggering a 
new moral panic about ‘immigrants’ (Lafleur and Stanek, 2017). The 2014 elections for the 
European Parliament brought surprises and electoral rewards for far-right populist parties 
across Europe. In Britain, UKIP had its largest success with 26.6%, but the far right in 
Germany got even more international press when the AfD won 7.1% of the vote in the very 
first election in which it had participated. Facing a new challenger on the right, the CSU thus 
began to extend its anti-immigration stance, to demand more restrictions on freedom of 
movement rights and on access to welfare for EU citizens. The same year, the newly elected 
Government responded to CSU’s demands, appointing a special committee whose mission 
was to investigate levels of welfare use and abuse of EU citizens. On 26 March 2014, the 
report was released. It showed that there was in fact little evidence of welfare abuse, yet it did 
underline how some cities and localities in Germany were in particular need of assistance, 
given the unequal distribution of EU migrants to certain cities (Ministry of Interior and 
Minister of Labour, 2014). The German authorities’ response was multifold. 
 
First, the federal government increased central funding to the most affected municipalities 
where there had been a rapid increase in demand for social protection from EU citizens. In 
total, circa €200 million were directed to these localities as a form of relief, followed by an 
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additional €25 million for housing and heating costs – despite these being local 
responsibilities. There was also money for professional training, schools and nurseries, and 
vaccination campaigns (Ministry of Interior and Minister of Labour, 2014). These were in 
effect ‘integration’ policies: assuming EU citizens to be ‘immigrants’ who were settling. 
 
Second, Germany stepped up its practice of referring cases on the welfare rights of EU 
citizens to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). In the past, the Court has been 
known as a source of progressive interpretations, but it too in recent years has been swayed 
by the mood of politics in Europe, delivering a number of important cases that have retracted 
social rights (Menendez 2014). In the German narrative, two cases, Dano and Alimanovic, 
have been vital steps.
4
 In the Dano case, the CJEU ruled that EU citizens would lose the right 
to access to certain social protection packages if after the first three months they did not fall 
under the categories protected by the Citizenship Directive: i.e., workers (whether dependent 
or self-employed), former workers, or jobseekers. Elisabeta Dano was a Romanian Roma and 
single mother in charge of a 5-year-old with whom she resided in Germany since 2011. She 
was already receiving child benefit and single-parent benefit, and applied for additional non-
contributory cash. The Court instead decided that she was not entitled claim benefits because 
she was neither a worker, a former worker or a jobseeker. In the second case, Alimanovic, the 
Court confirmed that member states can refuse jobseeker support to EU citizens. The family 
had settled in Germany in the early 1990s as refugees, but moved to Sweden in 1999 where 
they also naturalised. They then returned as EU migrants to Germany in 2010. The Court 
ruled that Germany could stop payments to the family as they were not in work and had been 
in unemployment for longer than a year. 
  
With this legal foundation, Germany could then develop a third strategy, building on the 
CJEU jurisprudence: to reshape welfare entitlements by removing the welfare rights of EU 
jobseekers. In December 2016, the Bundesrat voted to redefine eligibility criteria to withdraw 
both the jobseeker allowance and social assistance for EU jobseekers and their families. They 
would only have access to welfare if they had lived and worked for five years in Germany 
and become permanent residents. Unlike two years earlier when it was the CSU, CDU and 
AfD promoting stricter rules for EU citizens, in 2016 it was now the Social Democratic Party 
of Germany (SPD) which championed and indeed vouched for the ‘need and merits’ for 
retrenchment of welfare rights. The new criteria were to be applied not only to incoming 
jobseekers from other EU countries but also to existing EU recipients. The latter would have 
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four weeks emergency pay to cover basic expenses such as food and health care, but would 
lose the right to stay in Germany. At the end of the period, they would be entitled to a loan 
from the German State to finance the return to their home country. 
 
In a short period of time, and perhaps under cover of the disastrous scenario that had evolved 
in the UK with the referendum vote, Germany was in effect putting into a practice set of 





In open defiance of European Union principles, two of the most prominent EU member 
states, the UK and Germany, have been able pursue independent courses of retrenchment on 
EU migrant rights, using their political and policy resources to hand. Under cover of the 
Brexit crisis, European negotiators have also converged on a new ‘deal’ on rights of EU 
migrants close to David Cameron’s. The influence of these two migrant economies on a 
convergence within the EU on more restriction and selectivity would seem paramount. They 
have made it easier for politicians to call for emergency brakes, as in Spain, or sanction talk 
of state-imposed ‘quotas’ after the Swiss referendum on EU migration and the Brexit vote. 
The trends have also normalised the kind of state-controlled legal exceptions on free 
movement and migrant rights pioneered in Denmark (Adler-Nissen 2014; Greve, 2014). 
There have been moves to curb vagrant and economically inactive populations in Sweden and 
the Netherlands (Scholten and van Ostaijen, 2018). The example of Britain negotiating a ‘less 
free’ free mobility in the EU with all the members states and having to vote such restrictions 
in the European Council, had the perverse effect of normalizing the removal of welfare rights, 
indeed outing the eagerness of other members to buy into Cameron’s rhetoric. Everywhere, it 
has become easier to assimilate unwanted ‘low end’ EU migration to unwanted or 
unsustainable ‘EU immigration’. 
 
With the troublesome UK now opting out of EU law, the other member states may indeed 
have hit upon a remarkable solution to preserving a denuded notion of ‘EU citizenship’ 
without the social rights intended to protect the most economically vulnerable. The UK and 
Germany have demonstrated how to barbwire access to social assistance for mobile 
Europeans, while increasing (or at least not reducing) incentives to the high skilled and 
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highly employable. In line with this, remarkably, actual intra-EU mobility continues at 
similar rates as before the start of the multiple crises (Eurostat, 2018), and the everyday 
transnational practices of mobile upper but also many middle class Europeans and their 
families remain an engine for societal Europeanisation (Recchi, Favell et al, 2019). The 
resilience of the European citizenship in this sense is not miraculous: it has come at the cost 
of sacrificing access to social rights for those mobile Europeans most in need. 
  
This is clearly a defeat for the normative, egalitarian, post-national and cosmopolitan notion 
of membership implied by the ‘fourth freedom’. But there may be further consequences of 
this roll-back on the idea of national citizenship itself in the Marshallian tradition. As the 
examples of the UK and Germany suggest, once ‘anomalous’ EU migrants have been 
absorbed back into the frame of ‘normal’ immigration and integration policies, the exclusion 
from social rights of certain ‘unwanted’ EU nationals provides legal and policy mechanisms 
likely to enable states to also single out and exclude other categories of national citizens 
whose ‘non-discriminatory’ rights to welfare protection can similarly be questioned 
(Anderson, 2013). The anomalous post-national implication of EU free movement rights may 
therefore turn out to have been a temporary challenge that has only sharpened the capacity of 
national bureaucracies and national political systems to put the famous expansive, 
evolutionary Marshallian triptych of civic, political and social protection further in reverse – 
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